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Wage Theft: Pilfering Paychecks, One Lunch
at a Time
JAMES D. LEVAULT1
The United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division is
charged with enforcing the payment of minimum wage and overtime to employees. A common problem occurs when an employee performs work during their unpaid lunch. According to DOL regulations, an employee is entitled to payment for time worked whether they were requested to work or if
the employer was completely unaware that work was being performed by
the employee. Two tests are used to determine whether an employee should
be paid for the work performed. The first test is the completely relieved of
duty test and the second test is the predominant benefit test. The judicial
circuits are split onto which test to use. This Note analyzes both of these
tests and recommends the courts forgo the predominant benefit test and
adopt the completely relieved of duty test for uniform enforcement across
all jurisdictions.
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From an enforcement standpoint, the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor is tasked with enforcing these regulations. The Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 is the regulation that sets the maximum hours
worked for covered employees.2 Overall, the regulation seems straightforward and is not too complicated to understand; however, the circuits are
split on what test to use when analyzing whether or not the employee
should be compensated. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits adopt what has been termed the “predominant benefit test”
for determining if employee time is compensable.3 However, in the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits, the test that is applied is whether the employee has
been completely relieved of all duties during their meal breaks.4 The problem has thus become a lack of clarity amongst the circuits on what is a bona
fide meal period. My argument is that adherence to the administrative guidance that has been outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, which states
that an “employee must be completely relieved from duty,” 5 is in order.
This adherence would result in a bright-line test to be applied when determining a bona fide meal period.
In this Note, I will further examine and evaluate the tests that are utilized in the various circuits, and compare those tests to the stance that the
Wage and Hour Division makes in regards to hours worked. I will look at
reports and opinion letters written by the administrators from the Wage and
2.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.S. §§201-19 (LEXIS through Pub.
L. No. 115-84) (Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act sets the maximum hours for
employees at forty hours per week).
3.
See, e.g., Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015); Mitchell v.
JCG Indus., 745 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014); Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex., 207
F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2000); Roy v. County of Lexington, South Carolina, 141 F.3d 533 (4th
Cir. 1998); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1997); Henson v.
Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d /31 (8th Cir. 1993).
4.
See, e.g., Busk v. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2013),
rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014); Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003); Kohlheim
v. Glynn County, Georgia, 915 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1990); Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal
Serv., Inc., 510 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1975); Britain v. Clark County, No. 2:12-cv-1240-JADNJK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42205 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2015); Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 568
F. Supp. 2d 1300 (N.D. Ala. 2008).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (2011) (recognized as invalid by Havrilla v. United States,
125 Fed.Cl. 454 (2016)).
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Hour Division, and compare what the Department of Labor says with how
courts are reasoning on this issue. I will then conclude with my analysis as
to why the circuits should forgo the predominant benefit analysis and adopt
the completely relieved of duty test to create one uniform test that allows:
(1) investigators to have a bright-line rule for enforcement, (2) employers to
have a complete understanding of what is expected of them, and (3) employees to know when they should expect to be compensated for their meal
periods.
To set the parameters for this analysis, it is imperative to take a look at
a few of the preeminent cases that utilize both tests that will be further outlined in this Note. In Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the court found that “the
completely relieved from duty standard applies to § 785.19 claims in this
circuit, regardless of how other circuits have interpreted the regulation.
Therefore, any argument posited by either party to this action that the Eleventh Circuit applies the predominant benefit test to meal period claims under ( 78/.19 is inapposite.”6 The Fifth Circuit in Naylor v. Securiguard,
Inc. utilized the predominant benefits analysis when reviewing whether
security guards should be compensated for time spent during the meal period driving away from where they were working.7 In Naylor, “[t]he district
court applied the predominant benefit test in concluding that the guards
predominately benefited from the meal break despite being required to
spend a significant amount of time driving away from their duty station.”8
Like the court in Naylor, the court in Babcock v. Butler County utilized the predominant benefits analysis when deciding whether corrections
officers were entitled to overtime compensation for their uncompensated
meal period.9 The Babcock court stated “the predominant benefit test is
uncontroversial in the case before us—neither party disputes that it is the
appropriate standard. Accordingly, we join our sister Circuits in adopting
the predominant benefit test.”10
The circuits that utilize the completely relieved of duty standard that
was used in Chao v. Tyson Foods, pull their test and analysis from
Kohlheim v. Glynn County.11 “The standard for determining whether a meal
period is a ‘bona fide meal period’ in the Eleventh Circuit is set forth
in Kohlheim v. Glynn County, Ga. . . .”12 In Kohlheim, the court, quoting 29
C.F.R. § 785.19(a), stated that “[i]n order to be considered a bona fide meal
period . . . the regulations require complete relief from duty: ‘The employee
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1329 n.4 (N.D. Ala. 2008).
Naylor v. Securiguard, Inc., 801 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 506.
Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 156.
Chao, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
Id.
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is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or
inactive, while eating.’”13 The court went on to say that “the essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period
or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved
from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”14 Both of
these tests are addressed further in this Note but having a brief understanding before delving in is paramount to fully understand the rational used
when employing these tests.
I. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
It can be argued that even the creation of the Department of Labor was
the result of a conflict between those that were pro-employer and those that
were pro-employee.15 This same conflict arises when looking at the two
tests that will be discussed in this Note.16 Before assessing the strengths and
weaknesses of the two tests that are utilized by both the Department of Labor and the courts, a thorough understanding of the historical context that
gave rise to the Department of Labor is imperative. The creation and development of the Department of Labor provides a brief glimpse into the rationale that is used to justify both tests used for assessing whether a meal
period is compensable. From the tumultuous beginning, to the passage of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Department of Labor was never really
without conflict; however, through these times one thing remained the driving force, and that was protecting the American worker.17
The Department of Labor, as we know it today, traces its roots back to
the late 1860s when labor unions were making a strong push to elect Congressmen to develop an agency that would help protect the working class.18
In 1884, President Chester A. Arthur signed a bill that created the Bureau of
Labor.19 The Bureau of Labor was successful in its early stages.; however,
its supporters wanted more; they wanted it to be an independent department
with the head being a cabinet member.20 This led to President Cleveland in
1888 signing a bill that established the Department of Labor, but without
13.
Kohlheim v. Glynn County, Georgia, 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990).
14.
Id.
15. JONATHAN GROSSMAN, THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 3 (1973).
16.
Dean R. Singewald II, The Third Circuit Adopts Predominant Benefit Test for
Meal Periods, Leaving the Ninth Circuit As The Sole Holdout, WWW.WAGEHOURBLOG.COM,
(December 8, 2015), http://www.wagehourblog.com/2015/12/articles/flsa-coverage/thethird-circuit-adopts-predominant-benefit-test-for-meal-periods-leaving-the-ninth-circuit-asthe-sole-holdout/ [https://perma.cc/P34Y-8ZSY].
17. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 3.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 5.
20.
Id. at 7.
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the Cabinet level representation.21 However, this new Department of Labor
was not what the proponents of a labor department had sought, since it was
not a cabinet level position, what the unions were seeking was “a voice in
the Cabinet that would champion labor causes.”22
Then in 1903, “[t]he bill for a Department of Commerce incorporating
the Labor Department won the support of the Republican majority in Congress. President Theodore Roosevelt agreed because he believed that the
interest of workers and employers could thus be harmonized.”23 However,
this only lasted until 1913, when the labor leaders demanded an independent voice for labor in the cabinet.24 On March 4, 1913, President Taft reluctantly signed into law the bill that established the Department of Labor as
an independent agency; the head of which would be a cabinet level position.25 “President Wilson, in selecting the first Secretary of Labor, made
good on his campaign promise to be friendly to labor. He chose a workingman, a union leader, and a congressman who had been instrumental in creating the Department of Labor—William Bauchop Wilson.”26
“The purpose of the Department of Labor shall be to foster, promote,
and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.”27 In addition, those words, “are the cornerstone upon
which the Department [was] . . . built.”28 The creation of the Department of
Labor was viewed as a major step forward for those workers who had
struggled since the Civil War.29 The newly created Department of Labor
was a necessity to ensure that wage earners were properly protected, and as
Secretary Wilson stated “[i]n his first annual report . . . a philosophy echoed
in various forms by many Secretaries since . . . the Department was created
‘in the interest of the wage earners’, but it must be administered in fairness
to labor, business and the public at large.”30

21.
Id.
22. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 9.
23.
Id. at 9.
24.
Id. at 9.
25.
Id. at 10. President Taft did not see a need for a department of labor; however,
after the bill passed Congress and President Taft lost his reelection bid to Woodrow Wilson,
who supported the newly passed bill, Taft knew that a veto would have most likely been a
futile gesture and decided to sign it into law on his last day in office. Id.
26. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 11.
27. 29 U.S.C.A. § 551 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-84).
28. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 3.
29.
Id.
30.
Judson MacLaury, Chapter 1: Start-up of the Department and World War I,
1913-1921, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/dolchp01
[https://perma.cc/K7L6-F9NK].
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Enter the Depression, a time in which up to 12 million people were
unemployed.31 William N. Doak, who was appointed Secretary of Labor by
President Herbert Hoover after the resignation of Secretary of Labor Davis,
was put in a position in which he had to combat a failing job market and
unemployment ranging from 5 million workers when he took over office to
“at least 12 million” at its peak.32 “One out of every four workers could not
find a job.”33 Secretary Doak at this time “introduced the five-day work
week for Department of Labor employees” and also “suggested a six-hour
day . . . to spread out the work” for employees to help mitigate the effects
of the Depression.34 Both Secretary Davis and Secretary Doak were put in
difficult positions because of the Depression, and “[a]s a result of the Administration’s failure to foresee and adequately counteract the Depression,
later critics looked upon Doak as one of the worst Secretaries of Labor and
considered . . . Davis, not much better.”35
The Depression ushered in a new administration led by Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who was elected President in 1932.36 At the time of his election,
“it seemed impossible that economic conditions could get worse . . . [however] [b]y March, 1933, when Roosevelt took office, conditions were
worse.”37 The new figures showed between 13 million and 18 million unemployed.38 In his first inauguration address, Roosevelt “assured the nation
that he would put people to work.”39 This led to Roosevelt’s “war against
unemployment” and an unlikely choice for the Secretary of Labor, Frances
Perkins.40 Secretary Perkins had come from a “blue-blooded New England
family . . . [was] president of her class at Mount Holyoke College . . . [and]
had received training in social work at Hull House in Chicago.”41 Secretary
Perkins was hesitant to become Secretary of Labor because she did not feel
that she was a “bona fide labor person,”42 but Roosevelt insisted and “wanted to break precedent by appointing the first woman Cabinet member in
American history.”43
The history of the United States Department of Labor would be incomplete without addressing what Frances Perkins meant to the growing
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 29.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 32.
Id.
Id.
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agency. When President Roosevelt approached and offered Perkins the position of Secretary of Labor in 1933, Perkins ensured that Roosevelt understood what her goals would be before she accepted the position.44 She
wanted “to direct federal aid to the states for unemployment relief, public
works, work hour limitations, minimum wage laws, child labor laws, unemployment insurance, social security, and revitalized public employment
insurance.”45 Most of these ideas that Perkins had were incorporated into
the New Deal.46 “Secretary Perkins was the star of the dramatic events leading to the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.”47 Perkins
had already “warned [Roosevelt] that if she accepted, she would want to put
a floor under wages, set up a ceiling over hours of work, and abolish child
labor. She made the achievement of these ends a major goal of the Department of Labor.”48
A.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

“Prior to passing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938, Congress attempted to establish fair minimum and overtime wage standards
with little success.”49 As the language from the statute creating the Department of Labor indicated, and the language used by the first Secretary of
Labor, the wage earners were the primary beneficiaries of the Department.50
Labor standards during the Depression had collapsed.51 “While millions had
been looking for work, other men, women, and children had been working
long hours for pitifully low wages. Sweatshops had been the order of the
day in many industries.”52 Secretary Perkins and President Roosevelt were
dedicated to improving the conditions that workers faced but “opposition to
labor standards at that time . . . [were] fierce.”53
44.
Dionisia M. Xenos, Remembering Frances Perkins: This Lifetime Advocate of
Wor1ers’ Rights Helped Pioneer Today’s Workplace Safety and Health Programs,
OSHA.GOV,
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/JSHQ/fall2002html/perkins.htm
[https://perma.cc/VDD5-THAD].
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 45.
48.
Id. at 45-46.
49. JOSEPH E. KALET, PRIMER ON FLSA & OTHER WAGE & HOUR LAWS 2-3 (3d ed.
1994).
50.
Judson MacLaury, Chapter 3: The Department in the New Deal and World War
II,
1933-1945,
DEPARTMENT
OF
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/dolchp03 [https://perma.cc/M84K-2UX8]; see
also 29 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
51. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 46.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
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Starting in 1937, wage and hour legislation was proposed to apply to
all workers, and it was proposed that a federal agency be created to enforce
those standards.54 President Roosevelt strongly supported the legislation,
and there was a “dedicated effort of some labor leaders on behalf of the bill,
some elements of the labor movement actively fought the bill, while others
held the measure hostage to their specific demands.”55 Additionally,
“[l]abor opponents were not alone. . . . The business community was largely
opposed to it, and Southern Democrats often were linked with Republicans
in their opposition.”56 The FLSA did eventually pass, despite all of the opposition, “and President Roosevelt commented . . . that ‘I do think that next
to the Social Security Act [the FLSA] is the most important Act that has
been passed in the last two to three years.’”57
“The FLSA regulates employment practices in the area of minimum
wage, overtime pay, equal pay, recordkeeping, and child labor.”58 The Act
originally established a minimum wage of 25 cents per hour, as well as setting a maximum workweek of 40 hours.59 President Roosevelt was a supporter of the FLSA and was quoted as saying “[w]e are seeking . . . only
legislation to end starvation wages and intolerable hours.”60 The passage of
FLSA was seen as a major victory for President Roosevelt and Secretary
Perkins.61 The FLSA “was a precedent-making achievement in its time. It
covered an estimated 12.5 million workers who were either engaged in interstate commerce or producing goods for interstate commerce. It immediately raised the pay of 300,000 workers and shortened work hours for a
million more.”62
President Roosevelt, and many others, found justification for the Act
because of all the problems that wage earners were facing, even after the
creation of the Department of Labor. Before the passage of the FLSA, many
states had attempted to enact various restrictions on the number of hours
that women and children were able to work.63 Additionally, during the New

54.
Id. at 34.
55.
Howard D. Samuel, Trouble Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2000, at 32, 36.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. (citing FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT, 1938, 404 (Macmillan Co. 1941) (1938)).
58. KALET, supra note 50, at 3.
59.
MacLaury, supra note 51.
60.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, 1938, 6 (Macmillan Co. 1941) (1938).
61.
Samuel, supra note 56, at 32.
62. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 47-48.
63.
Samuel, supra note 56.
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Deal era, labor standards had become a major issue, especially with the
electorate in the 1936 presidential election.64
The FLSA also ushered in another major addition to the area of labor
law. In addition to setting the minimum wage and maximum hours worked,
it created an enforcement agency for these regulations, the Wage and Hour
Division.65 President Roosevelt viewed Wage and Hour legislation as a
major problem that was before Congress for action. According to Roosevelt, “[i]t . . . [was] an essential part of economic recovery. [And] [i]t . . .
[had] the support of an overwhelming majority of . . . [the] people in every
walk of life.”66 According to the Wage and Hour Division’s website, the
mission of the Wage and Hour Division “is to promote and achieve compliance with labor standards to protect and enhance the welfare of the Nation’s
workforce.”67 The language that encompasses the mission statement is
strikingly similar to the language used with the passage of the Act that created the Department of Labor.68 By creating the Wage and Hour Division,
the FLSA ensured that the regulation would have an enforcement arm that
would be comprised of investigators and administrators, tasked with maintaining proper working conditions for wage earners. “The Wage and Hour
Division . . . administers and enforces the FLSA with respect to private
employment, state and local government employment, and [certain] federal
employees.”69
II.ESTABLISHMENT OF HOURS WORKED REQUIREMENTS
Under the FLSA, an employer is required to pay all his employees
who are covered by the Act a regular hourly rate of pay, which is at least
equal to the statutory minimum, and in addition to this, to pay each covered
employee one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all hours which
he works in excess of forty hours during the workweek.70 “The two basic
factual issues involved in every wage and hour case are: 1) the regular rate
of pay' and 2) the number of hours worked.”71 Work has been defined as
64.
Id. at 34.
65.
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.,
Wage
&
Hour
Div.
Hist.,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/about/history/whdhist.htm [https://perma.cc/HLF2-ATW2].
66.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, 1938, 6-7 (Macmillan Co. 1941) (1938).
67.
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Wage & Hour Div. Mission Statement,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/about/mission/whdmiss.htm [https://perma.cc/68VX-F2WL].
68.
See KALET, supra note 50.
69. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Handy Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/wh1282.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BSM-H8HW].
70.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012).
71.
Culkin v. Glenn L. Martin Neb. Co., 97 F. Supp. 661 (D. Neb. 1951).
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meaning “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued primarily for the benefit of
the employer and his business.”72 “The definition of ‘hours worked’ has not
been limited to encompass only those situations in which an employee is
engaged in affirmative action.”73 While the FLSA does not define ‘work,’
the Supreme Court has construed it to mean “physical or mental exertion
[whether burdensome or not] controlled or required by the employer and
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business.”74 The test for whether an employee is ‘working,’ and thus presumably entitled to compensation, is whether the time is spent primarily for
the benefit of the employer or for the benefit of the employee.75 “Hours
worked is the time for which an employee is entitled to compensation under
the FLSA. Compensation is required for the time an employee is required to
be on duty . . . or suffered or permitted to work, whether or not the employee is requested to do so.”76
III. MEAL PERIODS AND THE TESTS
Under 29 C.F.R. §785.19(a)
Bona fide meal periods are not worktime. Bona
fide meal periods do not include coffee breaks or
time for snacks, these are simply rest periods. The
employee must be completely relieved from duty
for the purposes of eating regular meals, ordinarily
30 minutes or more is long enough for a bona fide
meal period but a shorter period may be long
enough under special conditions. The employee is
not relieved if he is required to perform any duties,
whether active or inactive, while eating. For example, an office employee who is required to eat at
his desk or a factory worker who is required to be
at his machine is working while eating.77
72. 29 C.F.R. § 785.7 (2011) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda
Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944)).
73.
Culkin, 97 F. Supp. at 672.
74. 29 C.F.R. § 785.7 (2011) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda
Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944)).
75.
See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944); see also Reich v. S. New
Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 389, 399 (D. Conn. 1995).
76. SUSAN SCHECHTER, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT EXPLAINED: A WAGE AND
HOUR GUIDEBOOK 159 (Ronald Miller, et al. eds., 1997).
78.
See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (2011).
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“Time spent predominantly for the employer's benefit during a period,
although designated as a lunch period or under any other designation, nevertheless constitutes working time compensable under the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.”78 All of a “lunch period” is not to be excluded in
computing the compensable hours of work if the employees are on call or
required to engage in duties during a part of the lunch period.79
The two tests that are adopted by the courts are the Predominant Benefits Test and the Completely Relieved of Duty Test. “Time spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit during a period, although designated as a
lunch period . . . nevertheless constitutes working time compensable under
the FLSA.”80 This outlines the first test that courts look at, the “predominant benefit test.” This test “assesses whether the employee’s meal time is
spent primarily for the employer’s benefit. . . . The second, the ‘completely
relieved from duty’ standard, focuses on whether an employee is actually
completely free of any work-related tasks.”81 The predominant benefit test
asks whether the employee is primarily engaged in work-related duties during meal periods.82 “The majority of the courts of appeals have adopted this
test.”83 The courts have refrained from giving a literal reading of the regulation that requires that an employee is completely relieved from duty during
a bona fide meal period.84 An “employee is not relieved if he is required to
perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating. For example,
an office employee who is required to eat at his desk or a factory worker
who is required to be at his machine is working while eating.” 85 The courts
instead look at the entirety of the:
circumstances to determine . . . to whom the benefit
of the meal period inures. Most courts derive this
approach from United States Supreme Court precedent holding that “[w]hether time is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question dependent upon all the circumstances of the case.”86
78.
Roy v. County of Lexington, South Carolina, 141 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 1998).
79.
See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (2011).
80.
Ruffin v. MotorCity Casino, 775 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting F.W.
Stock & Sons, Inc. v. Thompson, 194 F.2d 493, 496-97 (6th Cir. 1952)).
81.
Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 389, 398 (D. Conn.
1995).
82.
Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2015).
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (2011)).
86.
Id. (quoting Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944)).

176

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38-1

As a result, “the predominant benefit test is a fact-intensive inquiry.”87 Various courts take various approaches when looking at the predominant benefits test; some look to “whether the employee is free to leave the premises . .
. [while] [o]thers emphasize the number of interruptions to which the employees are subject.”88 According to the Eleventh Circuit, “the essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period
or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved
from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”89
As for the second test, the Department of Labor considers a meal bona
fide if the employee is “completely relieved from duty” during the meal
period.90 To be “completely relieved of duty,” employees must be allowed
to take their meals in an uninterrupted manner and be provided sufficient
time to eat.91 Such employees are “completely relieved of duty” even if,
during their meal time, they are restricted to a small lunchroom or prohibited from making phone calls or smoking.92 However, if a worker is required
or permitted to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, during the
time designated for eating, the worker is “not relieved.”93
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Currently, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have adopted the predominant benefit test for determining if employee
time is compensable; while the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits apply the test of
whether the employee is completely relieved of all duties during their meal
periods.94 The Supreme Court in Armour & Co. v. Wantock addressed the

87.
Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157.
88.
Id.; See also Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 745 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014); Hartsell v.
Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex., 207 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2000); Roy v. County of Lexington,
South Carolina, 141 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 1998); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121
F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1997); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d /31 (8th Cir. 1993).
89.
Id. (quoting Kohlheim v. Glynn County, Georgia, 915 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir.
1990)).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (2011).
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 745 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014); Hartsell v. Dr.
Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex., 207 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2000); Roy v. County of Lexington,
South Carolina, 141 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 1998); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121
F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1997); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d /31 (8th Cir. 1993); cf
Busk v. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 513
(2014); Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003); Kohlheim v. Glynn County,
Georgia, 915 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1990); Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Serv., Inc., 510 F.2d
84 (9th Cir. 1975); Britain v. Clark County, Case No.: 2:12-cv-1240-JAD-NJK, 2015 U.S.
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predominant benefits analysis by saying “[w]hether time is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question dependent upon all the circumstances of the case.”95 The Court again addressed this issue in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., using the holding in the Armour case, basically holding that no legal formula can be laid down to resolve cases when the facts are so varied.96 The Armour case and the Skidmore case both paved the way for what is now known as the “predominant
benefit test.”
A.

Second Circuit

The Second Circuit, in Reich v. Southern New England Telecommunications Corp., utilized the framework set forth in both Armour and Skidmore in looking at whether the activities performed by the employees were
“predominantly for the benefit of the employer.”97 In Reich, the court declined to adopt the literal reading of § 785.19, stating that “as with other
interpretive regulations issued by the Secretary under the FLSA, [it] does
not have the force of law.”98 The court went further and stated that “(
785.19, as literally construed, failed to persuade us primarily because the
completely-removed-from-duty standard is inconsistent with controlling
Supreme Court precedent defining ‘work.’”99
B.

Third Circuit

The Third Circuit is the most recent circuit to adopt the predominant
benefit test.100 “The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently joined the chorus of Circuits adopting the pro-employer ‘predominant benefit test’ when
weighing the compensability of meal periods under the Fair Labor Standards Act.”101 The Third Circuit noted that the predominant benefit test has
been adopted by the majority of the court of appeals.102

Dist. LEXIS 42205 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2015); Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d
1300 (N.D. Ala 2008).
95.
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944).
96.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944).
97.
Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1997).
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 65; See Henson, 6 F.3d at 536.
100.
See Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015).
101.
Singewald, supra note 17.
102. Babcock, 806 F.3d at 156.
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Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit noted that the FLSA does not define work, however, the Supreme Court concluded that within the definition of work is any
mental or physical exertion that is either controlled or required by the employer, and that the employer and his business are the primary beneficiaries
of that work.103 Again relying on the decision in Armour, the Court held
that work includes standby or waiting time. So, in the Fourth Circuit, “[t]he
critical question . . . is ‘whether time is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s.’”104 The Fourth Circuit takes a
somewhat unusual approach in an attempt to find some congruency between the two tests.105 Here, the Fourth Circuit states that “[i]n issuing this
regulation [29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (a) (1997)], the Secretary cited the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Stock with its ‘predominantly for the employer’s benefit’ standard as illustrative of the regulatory ‘completely relieved from duty’
requirement.”106 The Fourth Circuit then summarizes their conclusion by
saying “although ( 78/.19 (a) can be read to require that an employer may
only exclude meal periods from compensation if it permits an employee to
cease all duties of any kind during such periods, the Secretary did not seemingly intend such a broad construction.”107
D.

Fifth Circuit

In Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Texas, the Fifth Circuit held
that “‘ [t]he predominant benefits test’ is applied to determine who primarily benefits from the period.”108 The court went further to say that using this
test is a question of fact and that it should be determined by the district
court.109 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit in Bernard v. IBP, Inc., stated that
“[t]he critical question is whether the meal period is predominantly or primarily for the benefit of the employer or for the benefit of the employee.
The employer bears the burden to show that meal time qualifies for this
exception from compensation.”110 In Alvarez v. City of El Paso, in a per
curiam opinion the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the standard
that had been used in Bernard and stated that “[i]n resolving this question,
103.
104.
105.
106.
1952)).
107.
108.
109.
110.

Roy v. County of Lexington, South Carolina, 141 F.3d 533, 544 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id. (quoting Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944)).
Roy, 141 F.3d at 544.
Id. (quoting F.W. Stock & Sons, Inc. v. Thompson, 194 F.2d 493, 496 (6th Cir.
Roy, 141 F.3d at 544.
Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex., 207 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1998).
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we must decide whether the employee can use the time during lunch for his
or her own purposes.”111
E.

Seventh Circuit

In Leahy v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit stated that they “have
adopted the ‘predominant benefit’ test for determining whether meal periods constituted compensable work time under the FLSA.”112 However, the
Seventh Circuit has taken a bit of a different view on the predominant benefit test and stated in Mitchell v. JCG Industries, that “[t]he predominance
test is related to the de minimis doctrine.”113 Again, like the majority of the
other circuits, the Seventh Circuit takes the stance that ordinarily a meal
period would not be time worked under the FLSA.114 The court further
states that “[u]nder this test, a meal period is not work time if ‘the employee’s time is not spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer.’”115
Overall, the Seventh Circuit has followed closely with a number of the other circuits in holding that the test to be used for determining whether an
employee should be compensated for work during a meal break is the predominant benefits test.
F.

Eighth Circuit

In Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Department, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the appropriate test to be used for determining whether an
employee should be compensated for meal periods under the FLSA was the
predominantly for the benefit of the employer test.116 The court went on to
say that “[e]stablished in the earliest Supreme Court cases interpreting the
FLSA, this standard [predominant benefits test] comports with the Supreme
Court’s admonition to use a practical, realistic approach under the unique
circumstances of each case when deciding whether certain activities constitute compensable work.”117 The Eighth Circuit relied on the holdings from
both Armour and Skidmore to come to their determination that the predominant benefits test was the appropriate test to be applied.118 The Henson
court also noted that the predominant benefits standard had been both im111.
Alvarez v. City of El Paso, No. 01-50232, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 28606, at *2
(5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2002) (citing Bernard, 154 F.3d at 266).
112.
Leahy v. City of Chicago, 96 F.3d 228, 235 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996).
113.
Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 745 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2014).
114.
Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 1996).
115.
Id. at 710 (citing Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.
1993)) (quoting Lamon v. City of Shawnee, Kansas, 972 F.2d 1145, 1155 (10th Cir. 1992).
116.
Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d /31, /34 (8th Cir. 1993).
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
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plicitly and expressly applied in various situations when determining
whether activities equate to work under the FLSA.119 Additionally, it is
noted in Henson that the adoption of the predominantly for the benefit of
the employer standard has taken place in a majority of circuits that have
reviewed what the scope of work means under the FLSA.120 The Henson
court concludes “that the Wage and Hour Division’s meal period compensability standard lacks persuasive force.”121 Additionally, the court notes
that “[t]he regulation is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s longstanding
interpretation of the Act and would mandate the application of a rigid rule
in the face of the Supreme Court’s direction that courts take a practical approach based on the unique facts of each case.”122
G.

Ninth Circuit

In Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Service, Inc., the Ninth Circuit stated
that “[a]n employee cannot be docked for lunch breaks during which he is
required to continue with any duties related to his work.”123 In Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., the court, quoting Brennan, held that the
“FLSA does not require compensation for an employee’s lunch period, but
an ‘employee cannot be docked for lunch breaks during which he is required to continue with any duties related to his work.’”124 The Busk court
also, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 78/.19, stated that “[a]n ‘employee is not relieved
if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while
eating.’”125 In Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., the Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]t is axiomatic, under the FLSA, that employers must pay employees for all ‘hours
worked.’”126 The Ninth Circuit in Britain v. Clark County also held that an
employee must be compensated if they are required to continue with any of
the duties that are related to their work.127

119. Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Henson, 6 F.3d at 535.
122.
Id.
123.
Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Serv., Inc., 510 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
124. Busk v. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 713 F.3d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Brennan, 510 F.2d at 88) (emphasis added).
125.
Busk, 713 F.3d at 532.
126.
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2003).
127.
Britain v. Clark County, No. 2:12-cv-1240-JAD-NJK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42205, *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2015).
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Eleventh Circuit

In Kohlheim v. Glynn County, the court stated that “[i]n order to be
considered a bona fide meal period . . . the regulations required complete
relief from duty[.]”128 The Kohlheim Court goes further to say that “the
essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide
meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in
fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled
meal.”129 In Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the court seems to waiver a bit from
the Kohlheim Court.130 However, the court stated that in order to satisfy the
standard of a bona fide meal period,“the employer must establish that an
employee is ‘completely relieved from duty.’”131 The court went further to
state that “[t]o be completely relieved from duty, employees cannot be subject to ‘significant affirmative responsibilities’ during the meal period.”132
Both Kohlheim and Tyson Foods highlight how the Eleventh Circuit is still
using the completely relieved of duty test, even though other circuits seem
to believe that the Eleventh Circuit has moved towards the predominant
benefit test that is used by the majority of the circuits.133
Understanding how the courts view the distinctions between the cases
provides an interesting analysis on what factors to consider when determining whether to compensate an employee for a meal period or not. For the
most part, the circuits all agree that the analysis should be fact-driven, but
where they differ is on what test to utilize. The majority of the circuits apply the predominant benefits test which is contrary to what the Department
of Labor applies. It is important to have a grasp on how the circuits have
decided these issues before making a final assessment on why the “completely relieved of duty” test is the appropriate test to apply.
V. CASE STUDIES
The case studies in this Note will focus primarily on the circuits that
utilize the “completely relieved of duty” test as guided by the Code of Federal Regulations. Each case discussed infra will provide a brief snapshot of
the courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits view the facts and properly
use the administrative guidance issued by the enforcement mechanism of
the Department of Labor. These cases are important because they provide
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Kohlheim v. Glynn County, Georgia, 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1329 n.4 (N.D. Ala 2008).
Id. at 1306.
Id.
Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2015).
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real examples of how the “completely relieved of duty” test works, and how
it was designed to work.
In Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Service, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling that utilized the completely
relieved of duty test, as outlined by 29 C.F.R. § 785.19.134 In Brennan, the
Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the Department of Labor, filed an action
against the defendant, Elmer’s Disposal Service, for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act’s overtime provisions.135 There were a number of issues and claims raised in this case; however, for the purposes of this Note,
attention will be focused on the allegation made against Elmer’s Disposal
Service (“Elmer’s”) that employees were deducted a one-half hour meal
break every day, when they were not completely relieved of their duties. 136
The trial court in Brennan “found that because employees were encouraged
by the wage plan to work through their allotted lunch periods, and because
most of them did work through, the deductions made from the salaries of all
employees for a one-half hour lunch break each day were improper.”137 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding that “[a]n employee cannot
be docked for lunch breaks during which he is required to continue with
any duties related to his work.”138 With this holding in Brennan, the court
followed the administrative guidance as directed by the Code of Federal
Regulations.139 This strict adherence to the regulations is important because
it provides a clear understanding of what the implication of performing any
duties related to work during an unpaid lunch. Even though Brennan was
decided in 1975, the same rationale utilized by the court rings true today.
Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc. is another example of how the Ninth
Circuit precedent of following the language of the 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 is
utilized.140 In Gessele, a class action suit was filed against Jack in the Box
for violations of the overtime and minimum wage provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.141 The employees of this class alleged that, among
other things, Jack in the Box failed to pay for break periods.142 This failure
to pay, as the employees stated, was a direct result of employees being
called back to work while on their unpaid break in order to assist the others
employees when the store got busy.143 Here, more specifically, the
134.
Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Serv., Inc., 510 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1975).
135.
Id. at 85.
136.
Id.
137.
Id. at 86.
138.
Id. at 88 (citing Biggs v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 183 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1950)).
139.
Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Serv., Inc., 510 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1975).
140.
Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-960-ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51941 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2013).
141.
Id. at *1.
142. Id. at *14.
143. Id. at *23.
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“[p]laintiffs allege that Jack in the Box trains its managers that the needs of
the restaurant come first and to bring employees back from breaks early to
help out during a rush period.”144
In this case, it is undisputed that Jack in the Box has a company policy
that generally provides employees that work a six hour or more shift, an
unpaid break of thirty minutes.145 Additionally, according to Jack in the
Box, when an employee does not receive the full thirty minutes, then that
period is to be deemed a “rest period” and should be included in calculation
of the hours worked.146 However, the employees in this class claim that, in
addition to managers cutting breaks short, the “line between paid and unpaid breaks . . . [was] 20 minutes, rather than 30 minutes as stated in the
policy . . . and [Jack in the Box] programmed its computers not to pay employees for any break longer than 20 minutes.”147 What was disputed in this
case was whether or not the employees were deducted for meal periods
when they should not have been deducted.148
The timekeeping systems that were utilized by Jack in the Box created
additional problems when calculating whether a meal break was compensated or not compensated.149 One of the systems, Jack’s Timekeeping , automatically deducted any meal period, regardless of the total time.150 Employees were required to indicate the type of break they were taking, which
is what told the system whether to deduct the break or not; however, the
system would not allow an employee to clock back in from their meal break
before thirty minutes had elapsed without an override by a manager.151
Overall, the timekeeping systems that were utilized by Jack in the Box required managers to approve or not approve certain types of breaks; this type
of system is just asking for problems, and as indicated in Gessele, problems
were plentiful.152
Now, as mentioned at the beginning of the Gessele case, there were a
number of issues presented to the court.153 For the purposes of this Note, the
other issues are not relevant, but, what is relevant is the analysis the court
uses when discussing the meal periods. In regard to the meal period automatic deductions, the court notes that “standing alone, ‘automatic meal de144.
Id. at *23-24.
145.
Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-960-ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51941, at *23 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2013).
146. Id.
147.
Id. at *23-24.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. at *25.
150.
Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-960-ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51941, at *26 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2013).
151.
Id. at *25-26.
152.
Id. at *27.
153.
Id. at *14.
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duction policies are not per se illegal’ under the FLSA.”154 Further, the
court noted that “it is the failure to compensate an employee who worked
with the employer’s knowledge through an unpaid meal break—whether
the employee reported the additional time or not—that potentially violates
the FLSA.”155 What the court is stating here is that an employer is allowed
to have a timekeeping system that automatically adjusts an employee’s time
to reflect a meal period, so long as there is a mechanism to readjust that
system if the employee actually performs work, especially if the employer
has knowledge of the performance of the work.156
The court in Gessele is setting up the next step in the analysis of
whether an employee should be compensated for performing work during
their unpaid break. In Gessele, the court notes that “[t]he parties disagree as
to the appropriate test for determining whether a meal period is bona fide.
Jack in the Box cites cases which generally apply the ‘predominate benefit
test’ which examines whether an employee’s activities while on break are
for the benefit of the employer or the employee.”157 However, the
“[p]laintiffs contend that the Ninth Circuit has adopted the ‘completely relieved from duty standard’ which requires that ‘[a]n employee cannot be
docked for lunch breaks during which he is required to continue with any
duties related to his work.’”158
The court clearly indicated the contention between the two parties, but
this contention runs far deeper than just the parties to this case; this contention is the same type of contention that is faced throughout all jurisdictions,
due primarily to the lack of clarity on what test to apply when assessing
unpaid meal breaks. In Gessele, the court punts on what test to utilize and
focuses on how both tests required independent inquiries.159 The court
states that “[r]egardless of which standard the Ninth Circuit would apply,
both standards require individualized determinations for each unpaid break
between 20 and 30 minutes.”160
Similar to Gessele, the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., addressed
a situation in which employees were deducted for time worked during an

154. Id. at *66 (quoting Wolman v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc., 853 F.
Supp. 2d 290, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
155.
Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-960-ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51941, at *66 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2013) (quoting Wolman, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 301).
156.
Id.
157.
Id. at *67-68.
158.
Id. (quoting Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Serv., Inc., /10 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir.
1975).
159.
Id. at *69.
160.
Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-960-ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51941, at *69 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2013).
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unpaid break.161 As the court in Alvarez noted, “[t]he central dispute . . . is
whether IBP . . . should be required to compensate its employees for the
time it takes to change into required specialized protective clothing and
safety gear.”162 IBP was a producer of pork, beef, and other related products.163 President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 secured the passage of the
Meat Inspection Act, which provided for increased regulations in the meat
packing industry; both for the workers—statistically the meat packing industry is a very dangerous job—and the products being produced.164 Because of these increased regulations, employees in the meat packing industry are typically required to wear added protective materials.165
The IBP facility in this case was a meat processing facility that both
slaughtered and processed carcasses.166 The putting on and taking off—
donning and doffing in the legalese—of these protective items became a
point of dispute beginning in 1998.167 At this time, “[l]ong-running litigation between IBP and the . . . [U.S. Department of Labor] in the 1990s
spurred much of IBP’s shift-time reduction.”168One of the problems with
the litigation between the two parties was that it focused a great deal on the
pre- and post- shift times.169 However, what was lost in this litigation was
the time spent by employees donning and doffing during their meal

161. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). It should be noted that in
both Gessele and Alvarez, an employer is allowed under the FLSA and 29 C.F.R §785 to
deduct time from what would normally be, for example, a thirty-minute unpaid lunch if the
employee actually performs work during that time. In both of these cases, the employer is
not violating the FLSA if they only deduct twenty minutes from the employee for the break.
29 C.F.R. § 785 does not require an employee to receive a break of thirty minutes. What is
required from the regulation is that if an employee receives a break of less than twenty
minutes, that employee must be compensated for that time, but 29 C.F.R. § 785 also states
that if the employee works during the time being deducted then they should be paid. For
example, if an employee normally takes a thirty-minute lunch, but goes back to work after
twenty minutes then the employer can deduct that twenty minutes—so long as it was a bona
fide meal period—but they would need to begin compensating that employee once they
return to work; in this example, the ten minutes remaining in the normal thirty-minute lunch
must be compensated.
162.
Id. at 897.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 898.
165.
Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 916 n.2 (noting that “all employees must wear a sanitary
outer garment that is provided and washed each night by IBP; all employees must wear some
form of a plastic hardhat, a hair net, and ear plugs, and all employees . . . must wear a face
shield or safety goggles' all employees must wear some sort of glove” just to name some of
the items employees were required to wear as part of their employment with IBP).
166.
Id. at 898.
167.
Id. at 899.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
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break.170 “As a rule, employee . . . meal-break time begins as soon as the
last piece of meat passes on the production line, and, as a rule, employees
must be completely prepared to resume work as soon as the break period
ends.”171 Further, employees were required to remove all “outer garments,
protective gear, gloves, scabbards, and chains . . . . [T]he operation of IBP’s
mandatory donning and doffing rules necessarily impinges . . . [the employees’] unpaid thirty minute meal break time.”172
The principal inquiry that the court in Alvarez focused on was whether
the donning and doffing was considered hours worked under the FLSA.173
Traditionally, the donning and doffing of items is analyzed when determining both pre-shift and post-shift activities; however, when applicable—as is
here when the employees receive an unpaid meal period and are required to
remove items and subsequently replace the items after the meal period—
employers are required to compensate the employee.174 The Alvarez Court,
after determining that the donning and doffing of these items constituted
hours worked, looked at a Washington Administrative Code claim that was
part of the complaint.175 This administrative code requires an employee
receive more time than the FLSA; however, the analysis in determining
what should be compensable time and what should not be compensable
time is the same as the FLSA.176 In comparing the Washington state claim
with the FLSA, the court cites to Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Service, Inc.,
“[a]n employee cannot be docked for lunch breaks during when he is required to continue with any duties related to his work.”177 Continuing to
analyze the facts of this case to the state claim, the court continues to utilize
the principles outlined by the U.S. Department of Labor' “[n]o intrusions on
this thirty-minute period are condoned or even acknowledged . . . [and]
[u]nder Wash. Admin. Code § 296-126-092, plaintiffs are owed compensation for the full thirty-minute period where IBP has intruded upon or infringed the mandatory thirty-minute term to any extent.”178
In Alvarez, the court does not explicitly state which test they are using
to determine if the meat packing employees are due compensation for the
time spent during their lunch donning and doffing of the protective materi170. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2003).
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id. at 902.
174.
Id.; see also Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956) (noting that when an
activity is an integral part of the principal activity it is considered work).
175.
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 913 (9th Cir. 2003).
176.
Id.
177.
Id. (quoting Brennan v. Elmer’s Disposal Serv., Inc., /10 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir.
1975)).
178. Id. at 914.
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als required by IBP.179 However, the language that is used by the court indicates the deference that is being given to previous decisions, specifically the
Brennan decision from 1975. Again, the Ninth Circuit is looking to see if
the employee is performing any work activities during a period of time in
which they are not being compensated. Since the donning and doffing was
determined to be work under the regulation, the court held that it, the doffing and subsequent donning during lunch, was compensable time
worked.180 In addition, the fact that the employees were the primary beneficiaries of the safety procedures indicates that the court was not relying on
the predominate benefit test, since they determined that the employees
should be compensated.181
IBP found itself in the center of another class action suit filed by a
group of employees in one of their meat packing facilities.182 The facts of
this case were very similar to the facts in Alvarez. Again, as in Alvarez, the
employees sought compensation for the time that they were required to
spend donning and doffing equipment in order to use both the restroom and
the cafeteria during their meal break.183 Because of the holding in Alvarez,
IBP changed their policy to try and ensure that the doffing and donning of
the equipment during the meal periods would not be considered hours
worked.184 The new policy stated, “that production workers are no longer
prohibited from wearing frocks and other equipment into the cafeteria during the meal period, so long as the frocks and gloves are not excessively
soiled[.]”185
Plaintiffs in Chavez “argue[d] that meal break donning and doffing is
compensable, despite these policy changes, for three reasons.”186 The first
reason is because, like the old policy, IBP “imposes a duty on employees to
use the restroom during their paid rest breaks and meal breaks.”187 Next,
“Plaintiffs assert that . . . [IBP’s] cafeteria policy instructs employees to don
179.
Id.
180.
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 914 (9th Cir. 2003).
181.
Id.
182.
See Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29714,
at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005).
183. Id. at *35-36. The court in Chavez, summarized the finding in Alvarez and stated that the Alvarez “Court found that because employees were required by company policy
to doff equipment before entering the cafeteria or restroom, and because employees were
required to use the restroom during break-times, the donning and doffing of protective gear
to use the restroom constituted work.” Id.
184.
Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29714, at
*37 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005).
185.
Id.
186.
Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29714, at
*39 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005).
187.
Id.
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and doff their equipment before entering the cafeteria if, in the employee’s
opinion, equipment is excessively soiled188. . . .” And, “[f]inally, Plaintiffs
argue that workers are unable to obtain the full benefit of resting when
wearing heavy metal equipment. Plaintiffs argue that this encroachment on
workers’ break-time is significant because, while wearing equipment,
workers are not completely relieved from the pressures of duty[.]”189 To
counter the claims of Plaintiffs, IBP asserts that since the employees may
use the restroom while engaged in production time, and since they are now
allowed to wear their equipment into the cafeteria—so long as equipment
“is not excessively soiled,”—they now have a personal choice as to whether
they want to don and doff the equipment.190
The Chavez Court cites to 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 and states that
“[e]mployers providing unpaid meal breaks must ‘completely reliev[e]’
employees ‘from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals’ for a period
of 30 minutes or more.”191 Going further, the court states that “[t]he employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active
or inactive, while eating.”192 In discussing the requirements for analyzing
work performed during a meal period, the court states that “[a]n employee’s
compensable duties include any work that employers ‘permit.’”193 When
assessing whether an employer “permits” an employee to work, the court
relies on 29 C.F.R. ( 78/.11, which “provides that ‘[w]ork not requested
but suffered or permitted is work time’ and where the ‘employer knows or
has reason to believe that [the employee] is continuing to work,’ the ‘time is
working time.’”194
In regard to the donning and doffing during meal periods, the Chavez
Court, similarly to the Alvarez Court, held that when the donning and doffing reduced the uninterrupted time that the employee receives for their meal
period below thirty minutes, then the entirety of the break is compensable.195 The court in Chavez was much more direct than the court in Alvarez
when indicating the test they used when determining whether an employee
should be compensated for work performed during their unpaid meal period.196 The fact that the court relied directly on 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 indicated
188. Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. at *40.
191. Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29714, at
*40 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005).
192. Id. at *40-41 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (2011)).
193.
Id. at *41.
194. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 785.11 (2011)).
195.
Id. at *42-43.
196.
See Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29714,
at *40 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005); cf Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).
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that they were looking to the completely relieved of duty test in lieu of the
predominant benefit test.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Field Operations Handbook (hereinafter FOH), the handbook given to brand new investigators for the U.S. Department of Labor, states that
“[m]eal periods of less than 30 minutes during which the employee is completely relieved for purposes of eating a meal may be bona fide- and thus
not hours worked- when certain special conditions are present. . . .”197 The
language the FOH is referencing is 29 C.F.R. § 785.19. Investigators in the
field utilize a multitude of resources when conducting an investigation.
Among the items that investigators pull from are: the FOH, the Code of
Federal Regulations, administrator interpretations, field bulletins, and the
FLSA, just to name a few. One place that investigators seldom pull information from is actual court cases. Therein lies one of the problems with
courts inputting their own spin on how investigators enforce the provisions
of the FLSA; the FLSA is law, while 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 is merely a regulation. The regulation, unfortunately does not have much teeth, and as a result
the courts have been free to do as they wish when interpreting what the
regulation says.
When it comes to the two tests that are utilized by the circuits, the Supreme Court has not issued a ruling; however, those in the predominant
benefits camp tend to rely on the language used by the Supreme Court in
Armour & Co., v. Wantock, stating that “[w]hether time is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question dependent upon all the circumstances of the case.”198 When you take that
statement from Armour and couple it with the statement from Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., you get an idea of what the Court’s are looking for: “[w]e consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act [FLSA], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of experience . . . to which courts . . .
may properly resort for guidance.”199 The Skidmore Court, in discussing the
Armour case, stated “[t]he courts . . . weighed the evidence in the particular
case in the light of the Administrator’s rulings and reached a result consistent therewith. . . . Each case must stand on its own facts.”200 This language, when combining both cases, indicate that the Court is directing the
courts to utilize a predominant benefits test, when in reality the context in
197. WAGE AND HOUR DIV., DEP’T. OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 31b23
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/whd/foh/ [https://perma.cc/AVL2-JCPG].
198. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944).
199. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
200. Id.
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which they are discussing the test is more complex than whether an employee is to be compensated for work performed during a meal break.
The FLSA requires that an employee be paid a minimum wage and
overtime.201 Violations of the FLSA result from a number of scenarios.
Minimum wage violations occur typically when a minimum wage employee—like an employee of say, Jack in the Box—is not paid for all their hours
worked.202 When you add up the wages paid to that minimum wage employee for the hours the employer alleges they worked and divide that by
the actual hours worked by the employee, the chance of a minimum wage
violation is relatively strong. An overtime violation is a little more complex, but the guise is similar. When an employee—like an employee in a
meat packaging plant—is not paid for all their hours worked, and the employer is claiming the employees are working at least 40 hours per week, an
overtime violation will occur when those employees are not paid for all
their hours worked.203 As mentioned above, the FLSA is law and is binding
on employers and the courts. The problem with the FLSA is that in order to
enforce the various provisions, investigators have to rely on 29 C.F.R. §
785 when assessing hours worked, which, as indicated in Skidmore, is not
binding.204
So, from an enforcement standpoint investigators are relying on nonbinding regulations that the court may decide to uphold, or may decide to
strike down depending on the facts of the case and the jurisdictional
bounds.205 This makes the job of an investigator extremely difficult because
a smart employer is going to know, depending on the circuit, what they can
get away with when it comes to compensating employees. A bright-line rule
is the best way to solve this problem. For far too long, circuits relied on a
test, that is nowhere to be found in any of the rules or regulations that are
issued by the Wage and Hour Division. A bright-line rule would also enable
both employees and employers to have a firm understanding of the requirements. “Work not requested but suffered or permitted is work time.” 206
Now add in the language from 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 in which a bona fide
meal period exists when an employee is completely relieved from all duties.207 Taken together, these two regulations clearly indicate that the best
201.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012).
202.
Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-960-ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51941 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2013).
203.
See, e.g., Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29714 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005); see also Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2003).
204.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
205.
Id.
206. 29 C.F.R. § 785.11 (2011).
207. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (2011); see also United States Department of Labor Administrator Opinion Letter, FLSA2004-22 (Nov. 22, 2004).
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test to use is the completely relieved of duty test, and using this test will
indicate to an employer that if an employee is allowed to work through their
lunch and is not completely relieved of their duties then they should be
compensated.
Minimum wage and overtime violations are unfortunately extremely
common, in fact according to Department of Labor statistics, more than 1.3
million workers have been helped by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD)
in the last five years with more than $1.2 billion recovered in back wages in
that same time frame.208 “In fiscal year 2016, WHD found more than +266
million in back wages for more than 280,000 workers. . . .”209 As you can
see, wage theft is a rampant problem throughout the United States. A portion of that can be attributed to greed on the part of the employer; however,
the vast majority is simply because employers and employees alike are unsure how to navigate the treacherous waters that exist because of the lack of
clarity in what regulations to follow and what regulations not to follow.
Establishing a bright-line test will solve this dilemma regarding uncompensated meal periods, better protect employee’s wages, and protect employers
from big class action lawsuits.

208.

Wage and Hour Division: Our Mission is Clear, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
www.dol.gov/whd/data [https://perma.cc/3M9Y-PG9L].
209.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 209.
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